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PREDICTING DEFECTION 
Elmer J. Schaefer* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Eric Posner's cooperation theory of social norms develops from 
rational choice theory an austere and powerful explanation of 
why people comply with social norms.! He illustrates his theory 
with subtle analysis of a number of legal issues. The book will 
help anyone influenced by law and economics to incorporate into 
her thinking the work in sociology, psychology, and ethics that 
bears on human behavior. Most readers will find applications for 
Posner's theory. 
In Posner's cooperation theory, people play a number of pris-
oner's dilemmas in which a player receives a greater reward if 
she can obtain cooperation from the other player by avoiding de-
fection. There is a striking analogy to the picoeconomic2 analysis 
of an individual's decisions when faced with a conflict between a 
larger long-run and a smaller short-run reward. That individual 
can be regarded as playing a number prisoner's dilemmas with a 
future self, who can defect from a decision to pursue the long-run 
reward by switching to the smaller short-run reward.3 In Posner's 
theory a player defects from a joint activity because she applies a 
high discount rate to future rewards.4 Picoeconomic analysis, in 
* Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. 
L ERIcA. POSNER, LAw AND SOCIAL NORl\IS (2000). 
2. "Picoeconomics" is a word coined to refer to micro-micro-economics. GEORGE 
AINSLIE, PICOECONOl\fiCS xiii (1992). 
3. Cf. GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 93-94 (2001) (pointing to a close simi-
larity between a contest among "successive motivational states within a person" and a re-
peated prisoner's dilemma). 
4. POSNER, supra note 1, at 17. "Discount rate" refers to the present value an indi-
vidual assigns to future rewards. For example, someone who "discounts" a future yield of 
one hundred by assigning a present value of seventy has a higher discount rate than an-
other person who values the same right today at ninety. See id. at 17-19. 
443 
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contrast, highlights the fact that typically someone who defects 
originally valued the future reward from cooperation sufficiently 
highly to agree to participate in the joint activity.5 Unless she is a 
con artist, with no original intention to cooperate, the defector 
must have changed her mind. She now prefers to yield to the 
temptation to defect; whether she does so may depend on devices 
she can use to resist temptation. Understanding those devices 
may help predict whether someone will defect. 
II. POSNER'S COOPERATION THEORY OF SOCIAL NORMS 
Posner bases his theory of social norms on the prisoner's di-
lemma model of failure to cooperate.6 Players would gain by work-
ing together, but each player is better off defecting herself, no 
matter what the other player does. If the other player cooperates, 
then the first player gets the benefit of that performance, but is 
spared her own cost of cooperating; she can "free ride." If the 
other player defects, the first player continues to be better off not 
having cooperated herself. The second player will reason in the 
same way. Therefore, in a one-shot game, defection is the domi-
nant strategy for both players.7 
Defection, however, need not be dominant in a repeated pris-
oner's dilemma. If a prisoner's dilemma is to be played many 
times, then a player has an additional incentive to cooperate in 
early games; cooperation might lead to cooperation by the other 
player in later games.8 By a suitable strategy, each player, for ex-
ample, can convey a message that: "If you cooperate, I will coop-
erate, and we'll be better off; if you defect, I will also defect, and 
we will both be worse off. What's of special interest to you, my fel-
low player, is that if you defect, you will be worse off than if you 
cooperate."9 
In Posner's cooperation theory, repeated games with various 
players are linked by the players' reputations, which reflect their 
5. See generally AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS, supra note 2; AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF 
WILL, supra note 3. 
6. POSNER, supra note 1, at 12-15. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 15. 
9. This is the tit·for-tat strategy, explored in ROBERT AxELROD, THI~ EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION (1984). 
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history of defection or cooperation.IO Players, especially new ones, 
can improve their reputations by sending signals that they are 
"good types" who are unlikely to defect in a cooperative enter-
prise.ll They signal by complying with social norms.12 Such good 
types are more willing to incur the cost of giving up a reward in 
the short run for the greater reward that comes in the future to 
someone with a reputation as a cooperator.13 Other players (''bad 
types") reason that compliance is costly; it would be easier not to 
comply. Someone with a high discount rate will be less likely to 
incur the cost of complying with a social norm.14 Thus, noncom-
pliance signals that someone has a high discount rate and would 
not be a trustworthy potential partner. 
For example, a person can signal by charitable giving that she 
is a good type.15 
Donations to charity show people that one is wealthy and generous, 
and that one has a low discount rate. Bad types do not want friends 
as much as good types do, because friendship requires immediate 
and significant investment in return for an uncertain long-term gain. 
So giving away money in return for nothing is a way of distinguish-
ing oneself from the bad type. But it is important that people be able 
to observe one when one makes contributions.16 
Posner emphasizes an austere version of the cooperation the-
ory. Consistently, players draw the same inference from noncom-
pliance with any social norm, without regard to the content or 
significance of the norm: the offender is a ''bad type," in the sense 
of having a high discount rateP 
What is [so] powerful about the signaling theory is that it shows why 
schoolchildren and the rest of us devote so much energy and worry to 
what always seem in the grand scheme of things to be triv-
ial-clothes, hygiene, appearance, manners, forms of speech, and all 
10. POSNER, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
1L Id. at 20. 
12. Id. at 37. 
13. Id. at 19. 
14. Id. at 17. 
15. Id. at 65. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 36. Posner points out that people signal other characteristics, such as cul-
tural competence or intelligence. "Such signaling may give rise to norms. But a complete 
analysis of these phenomena would be overwhelmingly complex." Id. at 225 n.3. 
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the other attributes which, because of their salience, present oppor-
tunities for others to discriminate against us. IS 
In this austere version, the sanction for violating a social norm 
is automatic and severe: the violator is shunned.19 The coopera-
tion theory also explains why people will incur the cost of sanc-
tioning non-compliance with norms,20 even though imposing a 
sanction is a collective good. Sanctioning a non-complier will itself 
become a norm. Shunning a violator of a social norm, one signals 
that one is a good type; failure to shun a violator signals that one 
is a bad type.21 
III. TYPES OF "BAD TYPES": CHARACTERIZING DEFECTORS 
In Posner's theory, the partners that people want to avoid are 
the bad types with high discount rates.22 A bad type is considered 
less likely than a good type to cooperate in a repeated prisoner's 
dilemma, because the bad type cares less about the future payoffs 
that are lost through defection.23 But people with high discount 
rates can be classified into three categories, only two of which 
pose the danger of entering into a joint venture with someone 
who later defects. 
The first category of people with a high discount rate, the re-
fusers, will reject the venture in question, because it requires the 
sacrifice of a present reward in exchange for a future reward that 
is not great enough. But a refuser is of no concern to someone 
worried about defection, because a refuser will not enter into an 
agreement in the first place. 
But a would-be venturer should worry about a member of the 
second category, the con artists, who promise to cooperate while 
having a present intention to defect later. Con artists, are guilty 
18. Id. at 25. 
19. See, e.g., id. at 27. If someone "defects or fails to send the appropriate signal, ob-
servers will infer that he belongs to the bad type." Id. at 34. A violator may simply "have a 
tin ear for social norms," but "he is, in a way, demonstrating that he is a bad type since he 
shows that he has not invested in cultural competence." Id. at 27. 
20. Id. at 25. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 18-19. 
23. Id. at 18. 
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of promissory fraud. This particular bad type may send false sig-
nals of being cooperative, provided the signals are not too costly. 
Someone in the third category, a switcher, initially wishes to 
cooperate but changes her mind and defects when given an oppor-
tunity to seize a smaller, short-term reward.24 At some point, the 
preference of the switcher must have changed. When she wanted 
to cooperate, she must have preferred the larger, later reward. 
When she defected, she must have preferred the smaller, earlier 
reward. Con artists aside, a defector must be someone who yields 
to a switch in preferences.25 
IV. AsSESSING SELF-CONTROL MAy BE MORE USEFUL THAN 
AsSESSING A DISCOUNT RATE 
Entering a venture typically entails undertaking future obliga-
tions in exchange for greater rewards. Almost any signal, not just 
compliance with a social norm, is some evidence of willingness to 
bear an early cost, because the cost of the signal precedes the re-
ward from the response to the signal.26 Investment in education, 
for example, demonstrates willingness to defer gratification. Con 
artists and their special talents aside, someone demonstrates an 
intention to defer gratification by the very act of joining a venture 
that imposes early costs in exchange for later, bigger rewards. 
Rather than evidence of a future partner's willingness to try to 
defer gratification, a prospective long-term co-venturer would 
probably want evidence of self-control in the face of a major temp-
tation to defect. To see what that evidence might be, it helps to 
consider the tactics that people can use to resist temporary 
switches in preference. 
Those tactics are analyzed in picoeconomics, which studies the 
''bargaining within the self' that arises when someone anticipates 
that her preferences will switch as the moment of incurring op-
24. This short-term reward will be smaller than the gain from cooperation because the 
defector will suffer reputationallosses. 
25. Posner does not put much emphasis on yet another type of defector, someone who 
defects because changed circumstances imply that defection would yield greater commu-
nity surplus. This is analyzed extensively by writers on "efficient breach" in contract law. 
See, e.g., RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOl\UC ANALYSIS OF LAw 119 (4th ed. 1992). 
26. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 24 ("[A]ny costly action can be a signal, that is, a 
mechanism for establishing or preserving one's reputation."). 
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portunity costs approaches. The switch in preferences is ex-
plained as the result of hyperbolic discounting;27 there is consid-
erable evidence that most people follow that pattern of discount-
ing.28 Picoeconomics analyzes the strategies that a rational 
person might use to eliminate defection and get a later, larger 
reward. From this point of view, someone who will not defect has 
won a repeated prisoner's dilemma "inside herself." Often a non-
defector behaves as though she maintains a reliably low discount 
rate because she is good at exercising self-control. 29 
v. AN INTRODUCTION TO PICOECONOMICS: How DEFECTION 
OCCURS AND How IT Is RESISTED 
Picoeconomics analyzes an individual's struggles with shifts in 
her preferences as she gets closer in time to a choice between an 
earlier, small reward and a later, large reward. Whereas Posner's 
theory deals with the role of norms in signaling willingness to co-
operate in repeated prisoner's dilemmas,3o picoeconomics deals 
with the strategies used by an individual in a series of internal 
prisoner's dilemmas in which she is tempted to defect by choosing 
smaller, short-run rewards over larger, long-run rewards.31 
A. Preferences Shift When an Opportunity to Choose Becomes 
Imminent 
Picoeconomic analysis asserts that people often experience a 
shift in preferences as they approach a decision between a 
smaller, early reward and a larger, later reward, even though the 
larger reward was previously preferred. This is the finding of a 
number of experiments,32 including the following informal one: 
27. The hyperbolic discounting theory emphasizes the importance of the time delay 
between decision and reward. See AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL, supra note 3, at 2~5. 
28. Id. 
29. Cf. POSNER, supra note 1, at 192 (suggesting that a claim to be mature or to have 
self-discipline is a claim about discount rate); id. at 191-93 (suggesting that a person 
might signal that she has a low discount rate by claiming that she is influenced by guilt, 
one particular self-control device). 
30. POSNER, supra note 1, at 18-19. 
31. See generally AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS, supra note 2; AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF 
WILL, supra note 3. 
32. AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL, supra note 3, at 28-35. 
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If I ask a roomful of people to imagine that they've won a contest and 
can choose between a certified check for $100 that they can cash im-
mediately and a postdated certified check for $200 that they can't 
cash for three years, more than half of the people usually say they 
would rather have the $100 now. If! then ask what about $100 in six 
years versus $200 in nine years, virtually everyone picks the $200. 
But this is the same choice seen at six years' greater distance.33 
449 
Preferences will shift as the moment of choice approaches if the 
rates at which people discount future rewards fit hyperbolic 
curves rather than exponential ones. There is evidence that peo-
ple's discounting behavior follows a hyperbolic pattern.34 More-
over, hyperbolic discounting is consistent with Herrnstein's 
matching law, which summarizes much empirical evidence from 
behavioral psychology research with animals as well as with hu-
mans.35 Thus, picoeconomic analysis of the shifting preferences 
that lead to defection from a plan to defer gratification draws 
support from a large body of empirical research. 
B. Tactics for Resisting an Anticipated Shift in Preferences 
1. Social Side Bets 
Social side bets,36 which resemble privatized social norms, can 
be placed by declaring to others, whose opinions matter, that the 
declarant will resist an impulse or carry through a plan. For ex-
ample, the four students who first "sat-in" at the Woolworth's 
lunch counter in Greensboro believed their mutual discussions 
concerning the evils of discrimination committed them to accept 
the risks.37 This resembles a social side bet rather than a social 
norm, because the declarations occurred in a small group. 
A social side bet can be customized by the person who wishes to 
be bound, and in this respect differs from a social norm. However, 
a social side bet resembles a social norm in that reputational ef-
33. ld. at 33. 
34. See, e.g., id. at 44; Kris N. Kirby & R. J. Herrnstein, Preference Reuersals Due to 
Myopic Discounting of Delayed Reward, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. 83, 85 (1995); David Laibson, 
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443, 450-51 (1997). 
35. See AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL, supra note 3, at 34-35. 
36. See id. at 75. 
37. See DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 61, 
133 (1991). 
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fects are cruciaL38 In fact, someone could comply with a social 
norm as a means of self-controL While social side bets may not be 
as effective when the conduct to be regulated is private,39 to 
someone worried about a hard-to-detect defection, willingness to 
comply with a social norm in public would be less reassuring than 
a signal that someone would comply with a private side bet.40 
2. Private Rules and Other Tactics 
Tactics for self-control include making early legal or physical 
commitments (e.g., joining a Christmas Club for saving, not hav-
ing ice cream in the refrigerator, etc.),41 diverting attention,42 
regulating emotions,43 and adopting private rules that bundle de-
sires at different times into categories governed as an entirety by 
the rule. 
For example, someone who wants to lose weight might decide 
to eat less each day. When it comes time to eat her daily meals, 
however, she may encounter a shift in her preferences; the food 
looks attractive, and a small reduction in calories seems unlikely 
to make much difference in her final weight. She may therefore 
defect from her plan to consume fewer calories and similar defec-
tions may well occur in the future. Suppose that she then adopts 
a private rule not to eat dessert until she loses the desired 
weight. Now she can compare the loss of all desserts to the an-
ticipated later reward, loss of weight. By hypothesis, she will 
make her original choice, to prefer the later reward. 
38. See AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL, supra note 3, at 75. 
39. Id. 
40. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 24 (explaining that social norms are about observed, 
not concealed, behavior); cf DAVID RIESMAN ET. AL., THE LONELY CROWD 25-26 (1950) 
(analyzing the difference between "inner·directed" and "other-directed" people). 
41. This tactic was used by Ulysses, who ordered his crew to put wax in their ears, so 
they would not hear the song of the sirens, luring sailors to their deaths. Ulysses wanted 
to hear the sirens, so he did without the wax and had his crew tie him to the mast of his 
ship, so that he was unable to respond to the fatal temptation. This illustration was first 
used in Robert H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 
REV. ECON. STUDIES 165, 173 (1956) and is featured in JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE 
SIRENS 36-37 (1979). Some pigeons have learned to peck a key that removes the tempta-
tion of an early, small reward that eliminates an opportunity to get a bigger reward. See 
AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 131-32. Professor Tribe pointed out the analogy 
of using a written constitution to restrain "impulsive" violations of fundamental principles 
of government. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 10 (1978). 
42. See AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 133-35. 
43. See id. at 135-42. 
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To guard against a short-run reward that someone finds very 
tempting, a private rule should be a bright line. This makes it dif-
ficult to evade or adjust the rule under the pressure of the temp-
tation. Thus, the dieter with the no-dessert private rule might be 
tempted to create an exception when eating with a friend or by 
eating a "low-fat" dessert. Alternately, if the rule had permitted 
one cookie, one could imagine an incentive to seek out giant cook-
ies.44 
VI. TOWARD A LESS AUSTERE MODEL: COMPLIANCE WITH A 
SOCIAL NORM MAy SIGNAL MORE THAN WILLINGNESS TO BEAR A 
SHORT-RUN COST IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A LONG-RUN GAIN; IT MAy 
NOT BE A SIGNAL AT ALL 
A A Person May Not Have the Same Discount Rate in All 
Contexts 
In the austere version of Posner's theory, compliance with a so-
cial norm has one interpretation: it signals that the complier has 
a low discount rate.45 Russell Hardin says that the central claim 
of Posner's theory is "that we generalize across context to judge 
someone's cooperativeness. "46 
Economists usually assume that a person has a single discount 
rate for comparing present and future goods. In large part this 
assumption is supported by the fact that through markets and 
money, a variety of goods in an earlier time can be exchanged for 
a variety of goods at a later time. But many of the things one 
might swap between now and later are not readily available in 
any market. Thus, the problem of switching preferences can be 
strongly affected by the type of goods offered by the earlier, 
tempting choice, and the later, more rewarding one. 
44. Alcoholics Anonymous recommends a zero rule for people with difficulty control-
ling their drinking. A zero rule seems to be less malleable than some others. Ainslie sug-
gests that this may explain why problem drinkers seem to have more success in control-
ling drinking than problem eaters have in controlling eating. See AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF 
WILL, supra note 3, at 97. 
45. POSNER, supra note 1, at 18-19. 
46. Russell Hardin, Law and Social Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REv. 1821, 1824 
(2000). 
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The austere theory might fit two particular types of people: the 
elite group with a rigid code of conduct and the small group of 
merchants who deal mainly with each other. But these are special 
cases, marked by frequent social interchange. The generalization 
claim is much less likely to hold in other situations. 
A person's tactics for self-control often resemble Freud's "de-
fense mechanisms."47 Someone who relies heavily on one tactic 
might end up with a similar discount rate for most goods. How-
ever, a rule-bound person foregoes potential benefits; compulsive-
ness can be dysfunctionaL48 Using a variety of techniques to con-
trol impulses may well be more efficient than reliance on a single 
technique.49 
B. Compliance with a Social Norm Might Not Be a Signal but 
Instead Reflect a Preference for Engaging in That Conduct 
Compliance with a social norm only counts as a signal if the 
compliance is costly rather than done for its own sake.50 Posner 
gives the example of a monk with ascetic tastes for whom taking 
a vow of poverty involves no sacrifice. 51 He points out that the 
possibility that an instance of compliance with a social norm is 
costless makes it harder to determine whether the compliance is 
a signaL The possibility also makes it harder to test his signaling 
theory of norms. 52 
There are reasons to expect that people sometimes will want to 
comply with a social norm because they like that kind of behav-
ior. Social norms may reflect and be supported by underlying be-
liefs. In such cases, someone with those beliefs may find compli-
ance costless. 
Moreover, a social norm may be internalized, so that people 
want to comply. For such a person, compliance is costless. Posner 
acknowledges that internalization of norms seems reasonable, 
47. See George Ainslie, A Behavioral Economic Approach to the Defense Mechanisms: 
Freud's Energy Theory Revisited, 21 SOC. SCI. INFO. 735, 735 (1982). 
48. See AINSLIE, PrCOECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 226-27. 
49. [d. at 174. 
50. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 37. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. 
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but asserts that even if it occurs it has few testable implications. 53 
The possibility that norms are internalized, however, presents 
another source of difficulty in distinguishing between costly com-
pliance, which sends a signal, and costless compliance, which 
does not. 
c. Noncompliance with a Social Norm May Signal Traits Other 
than Willingness to Defect 
Violation of a social norm may indicate ignorance (Posner calls 
this ''having a tin ear") rather than unwillingness to take the 
trouble to comply with the norm. As Posner points out, a tin ear 
often reveals unwillingness to expend the effort to pay attention 
to what others find offensive.54 However, indifference to a social 
nuance might be consistent with steadfast performance of an ob-
ligation that does not require social skill. 
Scrupulous compliance with some social norms might signal 
diligence or even rigidity. Someone without those qualities would 
find it difficult to be so scrupulous. A certain insouciance in com-
plying with norms might signal moderation. An astute violation 
of fashion norms-a fashion statement-might signal originality. 
Such different traits may be desired for different ventures. A 
potential partner may be interested in a variety of characteristics 
besides resistance to the temptation to defect. 55 She might want 
someone who is diligent or someone who is original. An advertis-
ing agency would not want a drab conformist as a copywriter. 
D. The Beliefs Associated with a Norm Matter 
Norms and widely held beliefs are frequently connected. 
Shared beliefs may generate norms or help to make a practice "fo-
cal." Norms consistent with majority beliefs are more likely to en-
dure. However, an action that signals a low discount rate may not 
stave off ostracism if it also signals disagreement with majority 
values. 
53. Id. at 43-44. 
54. Id. at 27. 
55. Cf. id. at 34 ("A cooperative partner is anyone with a sufficiently low discount rate 
and sufficiently similar interests .... "). 
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Posner recognizes this when he observes that burning a flag 
can signal a low discount rate because it incurs a high cost in the 
form of the opprobrium of the majority.56 He adds, however, that 
because of this offensiveness, only those who reject majority val-
ues would be willing to cooperate with the flag burner. Thus, it is 
not enough to signal a low discount rate. In order to find part-
ners, it is sometimes necessary to comply with norms that sym-
bolize majority beliefs.57 
Proclamations of belief can playa role similar to norm compli-
ance in providing assurances of future cooperation. This is illus-
trated by the case of the sit-in by the four Greensboro students.58 
That example is also a reminder that the generalization thesis is 
often invalid. A willingness to cooperate in one context need not 
carry over to other contexts, if only because individuals use dif-
ferent methods of self-control in different contexts. Their willing-
ness to cooperate in a dangerous action seems to imply that the 
four young men in Greensboro had a low discount rate, but could 
they all have been counted on to show up for appointments on 
time or to save a higher portion of their resources than others do? 
And note that compliance with many other social norms would 
not have produced the commitment and the reassurance needed if 
the sit-in was to succeed. 
E. Costly Signals May Raise Subtle Issues of Insincerity 
If a signal before joining is discovered afterwards to have had a 
high cost, the signal may seem insincere. This is especially likely 
if the content of the signal matters so that the signal seems to in-
dicate a trait other than a low discount rate. As an example of a 
signal-induced distortion of a good type's behavior, Posner states 
the following: 
A non-religious person might claim that he is principled, then pro-
vide as evidence the fact that he spends a lot of time at church. If 
spending long hours at church is sufficiently costly and differentially 
costly, the person will distinguish himself as a good type by making 
56. [d. at 116-17. 
57. [d. at 117. Posner also recognizes the importance of the beliefs symbolized by a 
norm when he points out that flag waving will be a social norm only so long as it is a reli-
able signal of patriotism. [d. 
58. See CHONG, supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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this claim-but only if his claim can be checked out. If others observe 
that he does not go to church, he will be exposed as a bad type. The 
person goes to church, then, as a way of showing that he is princi-
pled, not because he seeks religious solace. His investment in this 
signal enables partners to cooperate with him to a greater extent 
than with bad types who cannot afford the signal, and in this sense 
serves to enhance cooperation. 59 
455 
Spending time in church would not signal that one has a low 
discount rate unless the church attendance is costly. For a devout 
person, church attendance might be costless. It would only be of 
interest to someone looking for a partner with religious beliefs, 
diligence, or some trait other than a low discount rate. For the 
first two traits, church attendance might be an effective signal; 
for someone without one or both of those traits, church atten-
dance would be costly. Only for a non-religious person would 
church attendance signal willingness to bear early costs in order 
to obtain larger, future payments. 
Suppose that the non-religious church attender lets a prospec-
tive partner know that he is non-religious. Church attendance is 
now an effective signal of a low discount rate, but the question of 
sincerity arises. A person who does something that he does not 
like shows a willingness to bear costs, but also reveals potentially 
undesirable qualities, perhaps stupidity or deceptiveness. A sin-
cerity issue may arise whenever someone is willing to comply 
with a social norm that he finds burdensome, that is, in terms of 
the cooperation theory, whenever someone signals that he has a 
low discount rate. And someone who is insincere might be un-
trustworthy, perhaps even a con artist. 
VII. TOWARD A LESS AUSTERE MODEL: SOME NORM VIOLATIONS 
MAy BE TOLERATED 
The most austere version of the cooperation theory assumes 
zero tolerance for violation of norms. Insight into the effects of 
zero tolerance can be gained from the picoeconomic analysis of 
the effects of strict "enforcement" of private rules to exercise self-
control. Zero tolerance has significant drawbacks, and rational 
people would probably not adopt it for enforcement of social 
norms. 
59. POSNER, supra note 1, at 191. 
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A. Using a Bright Line Rule May Be Costly or Infeasible 
Following a strict rule may result in the sacrifice of signifi-
cantly rewarding opportunities.60 Posner agrees, asserting that 
there are always some tradeoffs that are desirable despite a 
bright line rule.61 As an example, consider a bright line social 
norm against lying. It would have high costs in hurt feelings and 
painful social relations.62 
Additionally, deploying a bright line rule would sometimes 
yield only trivial rewards. Bright lines facilitate resistance to 
temptations to rationalize violations of a rule or standard. But 
many norm violations are not important enough to justify either 
strict definition or zero tolerance. Discipline might be sufficient 
without the need to resort to a bright line. Some alcoholics don't 
need a bright line. Indeed, when we witness someone observing a 
rigid restraint, one possible inference is that the person is subject 
to strong temptations. A social drinker may be less likely than a 
teetotaling alcoholic to get drunk. 
Finally, a suitable bright line may not be available. Private 
rules must be formulated in words; social norms often develop as 
an equilibrium, and an equilibrium is facilitated by a "focal" 
bright line. But, in a given context, there may be no line bright 
enough to be focal,63 and some of the brighter candidates might 
require an excessive number of suboptimal choices. 
B. Rigid Enforcement of Social Norms Can Lead to an 
Undesirable Lack of Spontaneity 
At the personal level, excessively rule-bound behavior can not 
only require bypassing significant opportunities, but can also cast 
a mechanistic pall over many activities.64 Similar bad effects are 
possible if social norms are rigidly enforced.65 
60. See, e.g., AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 177. 
61. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 194. 
62. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PuBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978); 
JAMES MORROW, CITY OF TRUTH (1990); LIAR, LIAR (Universal Pictures 1997). 
63. See supra note 44. There is no bright line for dieting. AINSLIE, PICOECONOl\UCS, 
supra note 2, at 168. 
64. See AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 177. 
65. Cf POSNER, supra note 1, at 117 (noting that excessive flag waving might comp. to 
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Because some slips may be wise or at least tolerable, a zero-
tolerance policy may have high costs. This is the experience for 
many private rules, where minor violations do not threaten sig-
nificant loss oflong-term reward.66 Violation of some social norms 
will be tolerated because perfect compliance is not worth the ef-
fort for the violator, perhaps because the slip is inadvertent.67 The 
approach of Captain Corcoran in H.M.S. Pinafore is often wise. 
Challenged ("What, never?") on a claim that he is never sick at 
sea, the Captain falls back on ''Hardly ever!,,68 
C. The Discipline of a Bright Line Might Be Damaged by 
Excessive Application 
Therapists have found that high stakes insistence on perfect 
compliance with a personal rule may prevent the rule from suc-
ceeding.69 To avoid this, someone might create an exception to her 
personal rules, a set of circumstances in which she gives up on 
self-control (e.g., panicking when giving a speech or binging on 
doughnuts after eating the first one).70 Similar collapses of social 
norms may be anticipated in a realm of conduct where there has 
been insistence on norms that are too strict. 
D. Without a Bright Line, Intensifying and Sanctioning 
Violations of a Social Norm May Be Difficult 
A norm is often not precise enough to rule out the acceptance of 
excuses for failure to comply. For example, the leader of the group 
organizing the freedom rides in 1961 missed the early leg of the 
journey because he was attending his father's funeral.71 This ex-
seem a hollow ritual, thereby eroding the norm favoring flag waving). 
66. See AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL, supra note 3, at 115 (keeping some resolutions 
may not matter much or may be too hard to do consistently). 
67. Cf. DEBORAH TANNEN, I ONLY SAY THIs BECAUSE I LOVE You 96, 98, 109 (2001) 
(stating that some people find that an apology can express a personal connection, help 
mark an end to a dispute, or make a future error less likely by acknowledging a previous 
error). 
68. W.S. Gilbert & Arthur Sullivan, H.M.S. Pinafore, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF 
GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 105 (Modern Library 1936) (1878). 
69. AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL, supra note 3, at 116. 
70. Id. at 148-49. 
71. CHONG, supra note 37, at 56-57. 
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cuse seems to have been accepted by the groUp.72 However, when 
it came time for the most dangerous part of the journey, excuses 
would no longer have been acceptable, and the leader got on the 
bus.73 
Further, when the applicability of a norm is doubtful, sanction-
ing an alleged violation may not signal that the censor is a good 
type. Instead, someone who zealously seeks to signal virtue by 
sanctioning an alleged violation risks being regarded as meddle-
some, excessively censorious, or foolish. 
E. Norm Violations Will Sometimes Be Analyzed Casually and 
Sometimes Carefully 
When consideration of whether to make an exception for vari-
ance from a social norm does not seem worth the trouble, a policy 
of zero tolerance may frequently be followed. However, with an 
important venture, a prospective partner can invest re-
source&-as with an interview or investigation-to interpret what 
seems to be a violation of a social norm. 
Initial screening of potential employees often takes place with 
relatively little information about the candidates. In this context, 
a minor norm violation might cause a candidate to be eliminated 
from contention at an early stage. One version of affrrmative ac-
tion emphasizes the gathering of that information about candi-
dates who otherwise might receive little consideration.74 Posner 
observes that all parties might gain if an affirmative action policy 
overcomes reputational concerns that did not coincide with the 
actual preferences of employers.75 
72. [d. 
73. [d. 
74. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 184 (1989) ("[IJn its weaker form, 
[affirmative action] encompasses largely process·oriented requirements, such as revised 
screening, recruitment, education, and training procedures to expand opportunities for 
underrepresented groups."). 
75. POSNER, supra note 1, at 141. 
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VIII. TOWARD A LESS AUSTERE MODEL: CERTAIN TYPES OF 
SIGNALS MAy BE MORE ACCURATE PREDICTIONS OF LOYALTY 
A. Signals Related to Performance Are More Likely to Predict 
Loyalty than Signals Directed at Obtaining a Partner 
Some signals incur costs that make performance more likely. 
These are more relevant to detection of a potential defector than 
signals that seem directed at obtaining entry into a venture. 
Thus, steps that manifest ability to carry out a contract, such as 
pre-agreement partial performance76 of one's future obligations, 
would reduce the likelihood of defection after entering a venture. 
Moreover, an early commitment may be part of a private tactic to 
resist a temptation to defect. A player who will later defect might 
adopt a signal that merely makes one seem to offer performance, 
without actually making performance more likely. Businesses 
sometimes emphasize getting contracts with customers without 
regard for their ability to provide the service promised.77 Separa-
tion of the sales department from the operating department 
might indicate a lack of sufficient interest in performance. 
B. Specialization of Signals May Help Predict Resistance to 
Defection 
Signals that are specialized to a particular partner make defec-
tion less likely. In contrast, signals that make someone attractive 
to many partners increase the opportunity costs of remaining 
loyal. A presentation tailored to a particular prospective partner, 
especially one that reflects costly research into the prospect's 
preferences, would be an example of the first type of signal. Mass 
advertising or a standardized sales pitch might be examples of 
the second.78 
76. Signaling by early partial performance has the unfortunate effect of weakening 
the signaler'S bargaining position. 
77. See Lori Enos, Report: E-tailers Winning Customer Service War, E-COMMERCE 
TIMES, auailable at http://www.ecommercetimes.comlperllstory/5515.html (Nov. 27, 2000) 
(quoting Professor Claes Fornell of the University of Michigan Business School as saying, 
"It is probably fair to suggest that many companies in the e-business have focused more on 
customer acquisition than on customer retention."). 
78. By reflecting on analogues in the world of personal relationships, one might come 
up with a theory of the economics of jealousy. 
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C. Formality in Setting up a Venture May Make Defection Less 
Likely 
A formality-such as an agreement, consideration, or expres-
sion of the understanding in words--often induces more delibera-
tion than a less formal arrangement.79 Greater deliberation re-
sults in a more serious commitment to performance of the 
obligations.80 Reputational costs of a defection are likely to be 
greater because breaching a more serious commitment consti-
tutes a more serious defection. Moreover, the sunk costs of delib-
eration may trigger a private rule that discourages giving up on a 
project until the sunk costs have been recovered.8! 
Agreement to a well-specified contract also discourages defec-
tion because rationalization or assertions of fanciful exceptions 
are less likely. The formal wording of a contract, however, might 
permit a form of opportunism that takes advantage of contractual 
language that fails to express adequately the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties. 
In this connection, Posner's claim of "radical judicial incompe-
tence" in contract interpretation82 threatens a system of social 
norms that depends on reputational effects. If courts are incom-
petent to accurately decide whether there has been a defection, it 
will be even more difficult for assessing the conduct of an alleged 
defector to do so. Whatever weaknesses courts have, they have 
subpoena power and other evidence-gathering techniques that 
onlookers lack. Moreover, courts must devote time to examining 
the merits of a dispute; onlookers have little incentive to do so. 
Indeed, if determining the obligations imposed by a contract is 
impossible for judges, it may even be difficult, especially with the 
human tendency to rationalize, for the non-performing party to 
know whether she has defected. 
79. Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799-800 (1941). 
80. Id. 
81. For a suggestion that giving weight to sunk costs can help someone make an ini-
tial resolution, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavior Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL L. REV. 1051, 
1124-25 (2000). 
82. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 152, 154, 156. 
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IX. Is A SIMPLE THEORY JUSTIFIED? 
For methodological reasons, Posner emphasizes the austere 
version of his theory, in which the content of norms is irrelevant; 
all that matters is the signal sent by the cost of compliance. Any 
violation of a social norm will lead to ostracism: refusal to cooper-
ate with the offender in any venture. 
A simple theory can have significant advantages. One classic 
justification is Milton Friedman's argument that a simple theory 
may make better predictions than its more complicated rival 
theories.83 With social norms, empirical testing is just beginning, 
so it is too early to tell which theories work best in practice.84 
However, the picoeconomic theory of self-control has enough em-
pirical support to remain in contention as a useful tool of analy-
sis. 
Additionally, Occam's razor85 recommends acceptance of the 
simplest theory that is consistent with the facts to be explained. 
But this is not equivalent to saying simplicity is the only criterion 
for choosing a theory.86 Occam's razor does not apply when every 
candidate theory encounters anomalies that are inconsistent with 
the theory's predictions.87 
A simplified version of a theory may facilitate an intuitive 
grasp that permits quick insights.88 For example, someone famil-
iar with a simplified version of Newtonian mechanic&---one that 
omits qualifications like the effects of friction---can make quick 
83. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positiue Economics, in ESSAYS IN 
POSITIVE ECONOr.nCS 3, 10 (1953). 
84. But tentative judgments may be possible. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 38 (noting 
that "rational choice theory has some successes," which puts it ahead of its competitors); 
id. at 39 (stating that altruism can be rejected as an explanation for norm-driven behav-
ioral regularities because it is inconsistent with much everyday behavior). 
85. Occam's razor is an ancient proposition asserting that the simplest explanation is 
generally the best. See Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitu-
tional Theory, 87 CORl\"ELLL. REV. 280, 283 (2002). 
86. That criterion is sometimes advanced. Perhaps it should be called "Occam's meat 
axe." 
87. Posner suggests that the anomalies encountered by rational choice theory may 
eventually be avoided by identifying the areas of social life where the theory works and 
the areas where it doesn't. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 38. 
88. See, e.g., id. at 46 ("[Cognition and emotion] are just not well enough understood 
by psychologists to support a theory of social norms, and repeated but puzzled acknowl-
edgments of their importance would muddy the exposition of the argument without pro-
viding any offsetting benefits."). 
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predictions about the behavior of a physical system. But often the 
right amount of simplification can only be obtained by exploring 
several versions of a theory. Both the empirical support for the 
picoeconomic model of switching preferences and the intuitive 
appeal of the stories it tells suggest that a theory of social norms 
might well benefit from incorporating the insights of that modeL 
A simplified theory may also facilitate testing. Posner suggests 
that introducing qualifications will reduce the purchase of the 
theory, perhaps by making it consistent with a much wider range 
of evidence and harder to falsifY. However, hard-to-specifY but 
arguably relevant variables haunt the testing of any theory. 
Omitting arguably relevant variables from a statistical test cre-
ates the possibility that the results are undetectably affected by 
the omitted variables.89 Thus, the simplicity of the theory will 
disappear when a careful empirical test is endeavored. 90 
Finally, restricting oneself to a few assumptions facilitates 
analysis of the full range of their implications. But that should 
not preclude theoretical exploration of other assumptions. More 
theorizing may uncover phenomena that have been neglected. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Both Posner's cooperation theory of social norms and the pi-
co economic model of conflicting individual motives address the 
problem of defection in repeated prisoner's dilemmas. The coop-
eration theory explores the use of signaling through social norms 
that one will not defect from a joint venture; picoeconomics ana-
lyzes the tactics that enable someone to resist the temptation to 
grab a smaller, short-run reward. 
Analyzing the factors that lead someone to defect-even though 
cooperation would yield a larger, long-term reward-identifies 
problems with a strategy that links all social norms together and 
89. Thus, developing empirical infonnation and understanding of social nonns, 
through exclusive reliance on an economist's tests, with statistical analysis of data col-
lected for other purposes, would encounter serious handicaps. See POSNER, supra note 1, 
at 38 (noting that the measurements used by social scientists tend to omit significant sub-
tleties in signaling). 
90. See id., at 37 (stating that an empirical test must take account of the possibility 
that compliance with a social norm reflects a taste for doing so rather than costly signal-
ing). 
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treats a violation of any norm as a reason to shun the violator. 
The ability to comply with a norm and the importance of doing so 
will vary from norm to norm and from situation to situation. 
Compliance with some social norms will be easy, requiring little 
self-control. With other norms, there may be exceptions or impre-
cision, so that interpreting an apparent violation may be difficult. 
Violation of some norms may be unimportant, so that a violation 
might signal inattention rather than a propensity to defect. 
Someone who complies overscrupulously with norms may be re-
vealing a significant fear of temptation or a costly inflexibility. 
Norms are often not free of content, so a violation may signal 
more than willingness to disappoint social expectations; it could 
signal creativity or lack of tact. As Posner recognizes, compliance 
with public norms is imperfect evidence that someone will with-
stand a great temptation to defect in secret. A person's values and 
self-discipline might be better evidence of her ability to withstand 
significant temptation. 
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